ارزیابی مدیریت سود در سطوح مختلف محافظه کاری و سرمایه‎گذاران نهادی با استفاده از قانون بنفورد

نوع مقاله: مقاله علمی پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشیار حسابداری، دانشکدۀ علوم اقتصادی، دانشگاه پیام‌نور، مشهد، ایران

2 دانشجوی کارشناسی ارشد حسابداری، دانشکدۀ علوم اقتصادی، دانشگاه امام رضا (ع)، مشهد، ایران

3 کارشناس‎ارشد حسابداری، دانشکدۀ علوم اقتصادی، دانشگاه پیام‌نور، بهشهر، ایران

چکیده

هدف اصلی پژوهش حاضر، ارزیابی وجود مدیریت سود در سطوح مختلف محافظه‎کاری و سرمایه­گذاران نهادی است که بر اساس قانون بنفورد محاسبه می­شود. بدین منظور، نخست شرکت­های نمونه که از بین شرکت­های تولیدی پذیرفته‌شده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران (جامعۀ آماری) و به روش غربال­گری (اعمال شرایط در جامعه) انتخاب شدند، بر اساس میزان محافظه­کاری و سرمایه­گذاران نهادی، در هشت گروه طبقه­بندی شدند و سپس با استفاده از قانون بنفورد به بررسی وجود یا نبود مدیریت سود در هر گروه از شرکت­ها پرداخته شد. نتایج آزمون فرضیه­ها بر اساس داده­های صورت­های مالی حسابرسی­شدۀ شرکت­های نمونه برای یک دورۀ یازده‎ساله (1382 تا 1392)، نشان می­دهد با افزایش سرمایه­گذاران نهادی، مدیریت سود افزایش می­یابد که ریشۀ این امر می­تواند افق کوتاه­مدت سرمایه­گذاران نهادی، تبانی­های سیاست­مدارانه بین سرمایه­گذاران نهادی و مدیریت و انگیزۀ زیاد در دستکاری سود توسط مدیران باشد. همچنین، نتایج پژوهش حاکی از آن است که سطوح مختلف میزان محافظه­کاری، تأثیری در مدیریت سود ندارد.

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

The review of earnings management in different level of conservatism and institutional investors base on Benford law

نویسندگان [English]

  • Seyyed Mahmoud Mousavi Shiri 1
  • Fatemeh Pishva 2
  • Hasan khalatbari 3
چکیده [English]

The main objective of this study was to evaluate the presence of earnings management (that calculated based on Benford law) at different levels of conservatism and institutional investors. First, the sample firms (selected from production firms in Tehran Stock Exchange) based on conservatism and institutional investors classified into eight groups and then using Benford law, the presence or absence of earnings management in each group of firms were examined. The results of hypothesis test on the basis of audited financial statements data of the sample firms for a period of eleven years (2003 to 2013) show that by increasing the institutional investor, earnings management increase, that this can be caused by insufficient experience of institutional investors, Statesmanlike collusion between institutional investors and management and High incentives to manipulate earnings by managers. Also, the results indicate that different levels of conservatism have no impact on earning management.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Conservatism
  • Benford law
  • earnings manipulation
  • Institutional investors
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