طراحی و تحلیل بازی استراتژیک مدیر ـ سهامدار: به‎کارگیری نظریه‌های بازی، مدیریت سود و حاکمیت شرکتی

نوع مقاله: مقاله علمی پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 کارشناس‎‎ارشد، حسابداری، مؤسسۀ آموزش عالی روزبهان، ساری، ایران

2 کارشناس‎‎ارشد حسابداری، دانشکدۀ علوم انسانی و اجتماعی، دانشگاه مازندران، بابلسر، ایران

چکیده

تعارض و همکاری یکی از مسائل ویژۀ رفتار انسان‌ها و سازمان‌ها و... است که هنگام تعامل با دیگران پدیدار می‎شود. مدیران و سهامداران به‎منظور حداکثرسازی منافع و حفظ همکاری، به اعمال مدیریت سود و حاکمیت شرکتی دست می‎زنند یا به هر دلیلی (و البته شاید اخلاقی) از اعمال آن صرف نظر می‌کنند. هدف، بررسی این تعارض و همکاری بین مدیران و سهامداران شرکت‌های بورسی با استفاده از نظریة بازی‌ها و یافتن نقطة تعادلی است که در آن مدیر و سهامدار به‎مثابۀ عناصر اصلی بازی در راستای حداکثرسازی منافعشان، رضایتمند باشند. فرضیه‌‌ها‌ با استفاده از داده‌های ترکیبی 87 شرکت بورس اوراق بهادار تهران بین سال‌های 1386 تا 1391 آزمون می‌شود. فرضیة‌ اول و فرضیه‌های دوم تا پنجم پژوهش به ترتیب با روش تابع بهترین پاسخ و آزمون من ـ ‌ویتنی تحلیل می‌شوند. در نهایت ترکیب استراتژی‌ مدیریت ‌سود شدید ـ حاکمیت ‌‌شرکتی قوی، بازیگران را به تعادل در منافع نمی‌رساند. همچنین در ترکیب استراتژی مدیریت سود خفیف ـ حاکمیت شرکتی قوی نیز، تعادل نش غالب ضعیف است.

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

Design and analysis of Manager- Shareholder strategy game: An application of game, earnings management and corporate governance theories

نویسندگان [English]

  • Mohsen Arab Kiasari 1
  • Saman Abdi 2
1 MSc., Accounting, Rouzbahan Institute Of Higher Education, Sari, Iran
2 MSc., Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Mazandaran University, Babolsar, Iran
چکیده [English]

Conflict and cooperation are the main features of organizations and human’s behavior which are revealed in contraction with others. To maximize their utilities and cooperation maintenance, managers and shareholders take action to apply earning management and corporate governance, or due to any reason (and maybe morally) they decide not to do them. The current paper aims to analyze the conflict between managers and shareholders in Tehran Stock Exchange, using game theory to find an equilibrium point in which the manager and shareholder are the main players, being satisfied across increasing their benefits. The hypotheses are analyzed by using pool data of 87 firms existing in TSE, over the years spanning 2007 to 2012. The first hypothesis and the second to fifth hypotheses are analyzed by using the Best Response function and Mann-Whitney test, respectively. By analyzing the result of the game, it is cleared that strong corporate governance strategy and intense earning management strategy don’t guide the players to equilibrium in utilities. Moreover, "strong corporate governance - slight earning management" strategy profile is a weakly dominant Nash Equilibrium.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • best response
  • Corporate governance
  • Earnings management
  • Game theory
  • Nash equilibrium
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