بررسی اثر چرخ‎دنده ای نامتقارن سود بودجه‎شده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران

نوع مقاله: مقاله علمی پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 استاد گروه بازرگانی ـ مالی، دانشگاه تربیت مدرس، تهران، ایران

2 دانشجوی دکتری حسابداری، دانشگاه تربیت مدرس، تهران، ایران

چکیده

اثر چرخ‎دنده­ای زمانی رخ می­دهد که انحراف مساعد (نامساعد) از عملکرد بودجه‎‎شده، موجب افزایش (کاهش) عملکرد بودجه‎شدۀ دورۀ آینده ­شود. هدف این مقاله، بررسی وجود اثر چرخ‎دنده­ای در سود بودجه‎شدۀ شرکت­های پذیرفته‎شده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران است. فرض می‎شود پیش‎بینی سودی که شرکت‎های عضو بورس اوراق بهادار تهران ملزم به افشای آن هستند، بازتابی از اهداف عملیاتی تعیین‎شده و بودجۀ داخلی شرکت است و شرکت با افشای چنین اطلاعاتی، در واقع ابزار کنترل بودجه‎ای خود را در اختیار بازار قرار می­دهد. نمونۀ آماری پژوهش شامل 325 شرکت پذیرفته‎شده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران، طی سال­های 1386 تا 1392 می­شود. شواهد نشان می‎دهد انحراف از اهداف بودجه‎شده در سال جاری، بر اهداف بودجه‎شدۀ سال بعد اثر می­گذارد؛ یعنی اثر چرخ‎دنده‎ای مشاهده می‎شود و انحراف مساعد از اهداف تعیین‎شده نسبت به انحراف نامساعد، بر تغییرات اهداف بودجه‎شدۀ دورۀ آتی اثر بیشتری دارد؛ به بیان دیگر، اثر چرخ‎دنده­ای نامتقارن است.

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

Investigating asymmetric ratcheting effect on budgeted earnings in Tehran Stock Exchange

نویسندگان [English]

  • Ali Asghar Anvary Rostamy 1
  • Zohreh Mohammadi Shad 2
  • Ahmadreza Maroufi 2
1 Prof., Accounting University of Tarbiyat Modares, Iran
2 Ph.D. Student, Accounting University of Tarbiyat Modares, Iran
چکیده [English]

Asymmetric ratcheting effect occurs when an unfavorable (favorable) budget variance causes in increase (decrease) in next period’s budget. The current study aims to investigate the existence of this effect on budgeted earning in Tehran stock exchange. We assume that the forecasted earning, which the firms listed in TSE are obligated to disclose, is the reflection of internal budget of the firm and the determined performance. By this disclosure, firms give their controlling instrument to capital market. Statistical sample includes 325 firms listed on TSE during 1386 to 1392. The results reveal that deviation from budgeted earning has a significant effect on the next period’s budget and unfavorable deviation effect is more than the favorable one.  

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • budgeted earnings per share
  • budget variance
  • forecasted earnings per share
  • ratcheting effect
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