اثر روابط سیاسی با دولت بر رابطة بین تمرکز مالکیت با کیفیت گزارشگری مالی و هزینۀ سهام عادی

نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 استادیار گروه حسابداری، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی قزوین، دانشکدۀ مدیریت و حسابداری، قزوین، ایران

2 کارشناس‎ارشد حسابداری، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی قزوین، دانشکدۀ مدیریت و حسابداری، قزوین، ایران

چکیده

این پژوهش اثر روابط سیاسی با دولت را بر رابطة بین تمرکز مالکیت با کیفیت گزارشگری مالی و هزینۀ سهام عادی شرکت­های پذیرفته‎شده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران بررسی می‎کند. نتایج آزمون فرضیه‎های پژوهش بر مبنای یک نمونۀ آماری متشکل از 95 شرکت در دورۀ زمانی 1380 تا 1390، نشان داد در شرکت­هایی که ساختار مالکیت متمرکز است، کیفیت سود نیز بالاست؛ حال آنکه در شرکت­های دارای روابط سیاسی گسترده با دولت که ساختار مالکیت متمرکزی دارند، کیفیت سود پایین است. همچنین در شرکت­هایی که ساختار مالکیت متمرکزی دارند، هزینۀ سهام عادی پایین است، ولی در شرکت­های دارای روابط سیاسی گسترده با دولت که ساختار مالکیت متمرکزی دارند، هزینۀ سهام عادی بالا است.

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

The effect of political connections with the government on the relationship between ownership concentration with quality of financial reporting and the cost of equity capital

نویسندگان [English]

  • Farzin Rezaei 1
  • Soraya Weysihesar2 2
1 Assistant Prof., Accounting, Islamic Azad University of Qazvin, Department of Management and Accounting, Qazvin, Iran.
2 MSc. of Accounting, Qazvin, Iran
چکیده [English]

This study investigates the effect of political connections with the government on the relationship between ownership concentration with quality of financial reporting and the cost of equity capital in companies that are the member of Tehran Stock Exchange. The result of research hypotheses test based on a statistical sample consist of 95 companies in period of 2001- 2011 showed that earnings quality in companies with concentrated ownership structure is high. On the other hand, in companies with extensive political connections and concentrated ownership structure, earnings quality is lower than other companies. Also, in companies with concentrated ownership structure, the cost of equity capital is low, but in companies with extensive political connections with government which has concentrated ownership structure, the cost of equity capital is higher.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • cost of equity capital
  • Multi-Criteria Decision Making
  • ownership concentration
  • Political connections
  • quality of financial reporting
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