بررسی چسبندگی حق‎الزحمۀ حسابرسی

نوع مقاله: مقاله علمی پژوهشی

نویسنده

دانشجوی دکتری حسابداری، دانشکدۀ اقتصاد و علوم اجتماعی دانشگاه شهید چمران، اهواز، ایران

چکیده

مشکلات نمایندگی در نتیجۀ تضاد منافع میان مدیران و سهامداران ایجاد می­شود. در این میان، حسابرسی راهکاری کارآمد برای محدودکردن اختیارات مدیران در روابط قراردادی محسوب می­شود. هدف این نوشتار، بررسی چسبندگی و تغییرات کوتاه‎مدت و بلندمدت حق‎الزحمۀ حسابرسی است. به همین منظور، داده­های مربوط به شرکت­های پذیرفته‎شده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران برای دورۀ زمانی 1387 تا 1391 استخراج شد. آزمون فرضیه‎های پژوهش به‎کمک مدل رگرسیونی داده­های ترکیبی انجام گرفت. نتایج پژوهش نشان می­دهد که چسبندگی حق‎الزحمۀ حسابرسی از روند مشخصی تبعیت نمی­کند. به بیانی، در دوره­های چندساله تغییر می­کند و در دوره­های کوتاه‎مدت (معمولاً یک‎ساله) تغییرات مشهودی در حق‎الزحمه صورت نمی­گیرد. همچنین، نتایج حاکی از این است که مؤسسه‎های حسابرسی در سال­های اولیه، حق‎الزحمۀ درخواستی خود را تغییر نمی­دهند، ولی در سال­های بعدی با توجه به شناختی که از صاحبکار به‎دست می­آورند، اقدام به تعدیل حق‎الزحمه می­کنند. در نهایت، نتایج نشان‎دهندۀ این است که تغییر حسابرس، سبب نزدیک­تر شدن حق‎الزحمه‎های حسابرسی به مدل استاندارد می­شود.

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

Review Audit Fee Stickiness

نویسنده [English]

  • Mohsen Rashidi Baqhi
Ph.D. Candidate in Accounting, Faculty of Economic and Social Science, University of Shahid Chamran, Iran
چکیده [English]

Agency problems were created between managers and shareholders as a result of conflict of interest. Auditing is an efficient way to limit the authority of the directors in contractual relationship. In this paper, we investigate fluctuations and changes of short term and long term audit fees. For this purpose, the data of listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange for the periods 2007 to 2012 were extracted. To test the hypotheses, the cross-sectional regression of the combined data was used. The results show that the stickiness of audit fees not follow a clear trend. In other words, it will be changed in a multi-year period and in short periods of time (usually annually) changes in the fee will not be visible. Also, the results show that the audit firm will not change their fee in the early year but, in subsequent years, adjust their fees according to the understanding of the client. Finally, the results indicate that auditor change resulted in audit fees closer to the standard model.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Audit Fee
  • fee stickiness
  • price behavior

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