کیفیت افشا در شرکت‌های خانوادگی پذیرفته شده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران

نوع مقاله: مقاله علمی پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشیار گروه حسابداری، دانشکدة مدیریت دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران

2 دانشجوی دکتری حسابداری، دانشگاه بین‎المللی امام خمینی (ره)، قزوین، ایران

چکیده

پژوهش حاضر شرکت­های خانوادگی را از دریچۀ کیفیت افشا طی سال­های 1385 تا 1390 ارزیابی کرده است و درنهایت به این سؤال پاسخ می‎دهد که شرکت­های خانوادگی نسبت به شرکت­های غیر خانوادگی دارای کیفیت افشای بالاتری هستند یا خیر. در این پژوهش از امتیازهای اختصاص‎داده‎شدۀ بورس اوراق بهادار و اقلام تعهدی اختیاری، برای عملیاتی‎کردن مفهوم کیفیت افشا استفاده شده است. شرکت­های خانوادگی در این پژوهش شرکت‌هایی هستند که اعضای خانواده از نفوذ شایان توجهی برخوردار باشند. یکی از شرایط وجود نفوذ شایان توجه در شرکت‌ها، عضویت در هیئت‎مدیره است. برای عضویت در هیئت‌مدیره، درصد مالکیت اعضا حداقل برابر با 1 تقسیم بر تعداد کل اعضا به‎اضافۀ 1 تعیین شده است. یافته‎ها نشان از برتری‎نداشتن شرکت­های خانوادگی نسبت به شرکت­های غیر خانوادگی از دید کیفیت افشا می­دهد. به‌بیان ‌دیگر، عامل خانوادگی­بودن رابطۀ معناداری با کیفیت افشا ندارد.

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

Disclosure quality in family firms listed in the Tehran stock exchange

نویسندگان [English]

  • Kaveh Mehrani1 1
  • Akbar Parvaei 2
1 Associate Prof. of Tehran University, Iran
2 PhD. Candidate of Accounting, Imam Khomeini University, Iran
چکیده [English]

This paper studies the disclosure quality in family firms in time period of 2007 to 2012, and aims to answer the question that whether the family factor will affect the disclosure quality. TSE’s disclosure scores and discretionary accruals are used for measuring disclosure quality. The family firms in this article are the firms that family members have significant influence on them. One of the factors for significant influence in firms is board membership. Board membership is measured by dividing 1 by numbers of board of directors plus one. Our results show that family firms don’t have any advantage in disclosure quality. In other words, the family factor does not affect disclosure quality.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Discretionary accruals
  • Disclosure Quality
  • family firms
Ali, A. Chen, T. & Radhakrishnan, S. (2007). Corporate disclosures by family firms. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 44 (2): 238-286.

Anderson, R. C. & Reeb, D. M. (2003). Founding-Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500. The Journal of Finance, 58 (3): 1301–1328.

Ashbaugh, H. Lafond, R. & Mayhew, B.W. (2003). Do nonaudit service compromise auditor independence? Further evidence. The Accounting Review, 78 (3): 611-639.

Bushee, B. & Miller, G. (2012). Investor relations, firm visibility, and investor following. The Accounting Review, 87 (3): 867-897.

Chen, S. Chen, X. & Cheng, Q. (2008). Do Family Firms Provide More or Less Voluntary Disclosure? Journal of Accounting Research, 64 (3): 499-536.

Dechow, P. Sloan, R. & Sweeney, A. (1995). Detecting earnings management. The Accounting Review, 70 (2): 193-225.

Demsetz, H. & Lehn, K. (1985). The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences. Journal of Political Economy, 93 (6): 1155-1177.

Field, A. (2009). Discovering Statistics Using SPSS Introducing Statistical Method. Third ED. Dubai: SAGE Publications Ltd.

Greene, W. (2011). Econometric Analysis. SeventhED. United states of America: Prentice-hall publication.

Jensen, M. C. & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behaviour, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3 (4): 305-360.

Jo, H. & Kim, Y. (2007). Disclosure frequency and earnings management. Journal of Financial Economics, 84 (2): 561-590.

Moradzadehfard, M. Nazemi Ardakani, M. Gholami, R. & Farzani, H. (2009). The Relationship between Institutional Stock Ownership and Earnings Management in Listed Companies on Tehran Stock Exchange. The Iranian accounting and auditing review, 16 (2): 85-98. (in Persian)

Namazi, M. & Mohammadi, M. (2010). Examines the earnings quality and returns of family and nonfamily in Tehran Stock Exchange. Accounting advances, 2 (2): 154-159. (in Persian)

Nasrolahi, Z. & Arefmanesh, Z. (2010). Examine the relationship between ownership and earnings quality of listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange. Accounting knowledge, 1 (3): 117-138. (in Persian)

Noravesh, A. & Ebrahimi kordlar, A. (2005). Examines and explains the relationship between the Shareholders composition with information asymmetry and usefulness of accounting measures. Iranian accounting and auditing review, 12 (4): 97-124. (in Persian)

Noravesh, A. & Hosseini, A. (2009). Corporate Disclosure Quality (consist of timeliness and reliability) and Earnings Management. Iranian accounting and auditing review, 16 (2): 117-134. (in Persian)

Scott, W. R. (2009). Financial Accounting Theory. Fifth Ed. United states of America: Pearson education.

Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R. W. (1986). Large Shareholders and Corporate Control. Journal of Political Economy, 94 (3): 461-488.

Shleifer, A. &Vishny, R. W. (1997). A Survey of Corporate Governance. The Journal of Finance, 52 (2): 737-783.

Soltani, B. (2007). Auditing an International Approach. First Edition.England: Pearson education,

The economist journal (2014). Business in the blood. November publication, available at: http://www.economist.com/news/business/21629385-companies - controlled-founding-families-remain-surprisingly-important-and-look-set-stay.

Warfield, T.D. Wild, J.J. & Wild, K.L. (1995). Managerial ownership, accounting choices, and informativeness of earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 20 (1): 61-91.

Wolk, H.I. Dodd, J.L. Rozycki, J.J. (2007). Accounting Theory: Conceptual Issues in a Political and Economic Environment. Seventh Ed. United states of America: Sage Publication Inc.