عنوان مقاله [English]
This analytical article attempts to show that although the underlying assumption of most current market-based research is
market efficiency (efficient market hypothesis), nonetheless, there
exist an asymmetry of information between management and stockholers or creditors. Therefore, appropriate disclosure
policies can transfer the private information of management to outsiders and as a result reduce the percevied level of risk
associated with the firm.
Such reduction in risk could also result from a monitoring mechanism which is necessitated by the perceived conflict of
interest between the contracting parties (i. e., theory of the firm). It is argued that in addition to the mandatory disclosures as
dictated by regulatory agencies, disclosure of other relevant financial as well as non-financial information will have the
potential of correcting the price of "mispriced" securities. The article closes by recommending certain non-mandatory disclosure items that could be benefici:1I to the firm.