the effect of manager’s narcissism on voluntary disclosure of company information

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Associate Prof., Department of Accounting, Faculty of Social Sciences and Economic, Alzahra University, Tehran, Iran.

2 ph.D. Candidate

3 MSc., Department of Accounting, Qom University, Qom, Iran

Abstract

the effect of manager’s narcissism on voluntary disclosure of company information

Abstract

Objective: The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of manager’s narcissism on voluntary disclosure of company information.

Methods: With the use of data gathered in the time period of 1388 to 1397 from 135 companies listed on Tehran’s Stock Exchange, the hypotheses tests has been performed using multiple regression.

Results: After doing statistical analysis on managers narcissism on voluntary discluser of company information the result of the hypotheses show that it has a signifact and meaningful negative effects. In this study two indicators of “the ratio of managers rewards to total salaries” and “the size of managers signatures” have been used to measure manager’s narcissism. According to the result of the study, in companies where the ratio of manager’s bonuses is paid a higher percentage than other managers in other companies, as well as managers who have a larger signature size, discretionary disclosure of information is less.

Conclusion: The personality traits of narcissistic managers, compared to other managers, lead them to take actions that are out of the ordinary and seek the attention and praise of others, and tnd these actions will ultimatly affect the performance of the orginazatio. Therefore, personal prejudices and positive illusions of narcissistic managers affect the supply of finantial information to the stock exchange, and therfore, these managers tend to ignore confidential negative feedback and will provide information about the company’s performance when communicating with the shareholders inspite of considering the reality of the matter. In addition these managers may knowingly mispressent information to convince investors that ongoing projects have promissing future. Thus, the occurrence of this phenomenon among managers will cause them to try to reduce the disclosure of voluntary information to investors and other shareholders by using different methods.



Keywords: behavioral finances, disclosure of information, manager’s narcissism

the effect of manager’s narcissism on voluntary disclosure of company information

Keywords: behavioral finances, disclosure of information, manager’s narcissism
the effect of manager’s narcissism on voluntary disclosure of company information

Keywords: behavioral finances, disclosure of information, manager’s narcissism
the effect of manager’s narcissism on voluntary disclosure of company information

Keywords: behavioral finances, disclosure of information, manager’s narcissism
the effect of manager’s narcissism on voluntary disclosure of company information

the effect of manager’s narcissism on voluntary disclosure of company information

Keywords: behavioral finances, disclosure of information, manager’s narcissism
Keywords: behavioral finances, disclosure of information, manager’s narcissism

Keywords

Main Subjects