This article extends the concept of agency theory to
multi-objective contractual settings and operationalizes the
elements of the basic agency model by applying that model to the
operations of a CPA firm, and specifying the pareto-optimal
contracts that can be established between the agent and principal.
The author demonstrates that when a principal faces
multi-objective contractual decisions and when a CPA
firm's, accounting system provides information that explicitly
formulates the agent-principal model, the principal can determine
quantitatively the effect of a given agent's contract on the
operations and objectives of the firm. The article also illustrates
the sensitivity of each alternative contract and specific sacrifices a
principal must make to satisfy the demands inherent in each of an
agent's alternative contract proposals. Finally, for each alternative
optimal contract, the author derives the optimal scheduling
assignments for each auditor in each auditing activity.
This pragmatic scheduling assignment also reflects those
changes in the auditor's assignments for each activity necessitated
by the hiring of a new agent.
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