University of TehranAccounting and Auditing Review2645-802025420181222Investigating the Influence of Managers' Narcissism on Financial Reporting QualityInvestigating the Influence of Managers' Narcissism on Financial Reporting Quality4574787021010.22059/acctgrev.2019.268759.1008035FAVajiheBazrafshanMSc. Student, Department of Accounting, Faculty of Administrative Sciences, Imam Reza International University, Mashhad, IranAmenehBazrafshanAssistant Prof., Department of Accounting, Faculty of Administrative Sciences, Imam Reza International University, Mashhad, IranMahdiSalehiAssociate Prof., Department of Accounting, Faculty of Administrative and Economics Sciences, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Mashhad, Iran0000-0003-2698-9817Journal Article20181111<strong>Objective:</strong> This research studies the impact of managers' narcissism on financial reporting quality. Theoretically, self-identified managers with behavioral characteristics such as excessive selfishness, the tendency to exploit others to their own needs, mastery of decision-making processes, and lack of feedback from others tend to be fraudulent financial reporting. <br /><strong>Methods:</strong> To measure narcissism, two proxies are used: area of managers’ signatures and the ratio of managers' remuneration to total annual salary of employees. Three proxies are used to measure the financial reporting quality: earnings management, earnings quality and conservatism. To test the hypotheses, multiple regression is used. The realm of research is from 2009 to 2016. <br /><strong>Results:</strong> Findings from a survey of 140 companies indicate that there is no significant relationship between managers’ narcissism based on signature size and financial reporting quality. However, the managers’ narcissism based on the managers' remuneration ratio on employee salary has a positive and significant relationship with two of the financial reporting quality proxy (including earnings management and earnings quality). Thus, the managers’ narcissism leads to increase earnings management and reduce earnings quality. <br /><strong>Conclusion:</strong> The results explain the impact of the managers’ narcissistic phenomenon on the financial reporting quality.<strong>Objective:</strong> This research studies the impact of managers' narcissism on financial reporting quality. Theoretically, self-identified managers with behavioral characteristics such as excessive selfishness, the tendency to exploit others to their own needs, mastery of decision-making processes, and lack of feedback from others tend to be fraudulent financial reporting. <br /><strong>Methods:</strong> To measure narcissism, two proxies are used: area of managers’ signatures and the ratio of managers' remuneration to total annual salary of employees. Three proxies are used to measure the financial reporting quality: earnings management, earnings quality and conservatism. To test the hypotheses, multiple regression is used. The realm of research is from 2009 to 2016. <br /><strong>Results:</strong> Findings from a survey of 140 companies indicate that there is no significant relationship between managers’ narcissism based on signature size and financial reporting quality. However, the managers’ narcissism based on the managers' remuneration ratio on employee salary has a positive and significant relationship with two of the financial reporting quality proxy (including earnings management and earnings quality). Thus, the managers’ narcissism leads to increase earnings management and reduce earnings quality. <br /><strong>Conclusion:</strong> The results explain the impact of the managers’ narcissistic phenomenon on the financial reporting quality.University of TehranAccounting and Auditing Review2645-802025420181222Behavioral Explanation of Management Decision Making in Intangible Asset Investments: Compensation Hypothesis Test
by Laboratory ApproachBehavioral Explanation of Management Decision Making in Intangible Asset Investments: Compensation Hypothesis Test
by Laboratory Approach4794967021210.22059/acctgrev.2019.262770.1007949FAAkbarParvaeiPh.D. Candidate, Department of Accounting, Imam Khomeini International University, Qazvin, IranGholamrezaKordestaniAssociate Prof., Department of Accounting, Imam Khomeini International University, Qazvin , Iran.Journal Article20180725<strong>Objective:</strong> Choosing between accounting treatments for intangible assets, which include expensing or capitalizing all expenditures, is influenced by factors such as the relationship between decision making and compensation scheme. This paper examines influential factors for decision making of management regarding intangible asset investments emphasizing compensation hypothesis. <br /><strong>Methods:</strong> Laboratory experiment is applied to specify the relationship between compensation and management decision making regarding intangible assets. Our population consists of senior managers, board of directors (public and private company) and skilled academics and our examinees equal to 195 people. <br /><strong>Results:</strong> Our findings show that management decision making is influenced by accounting treatments and managers prefer purchasing method to developing method and developing with extra disclosures method which can be explained by certainty effect theory. Moreover, our study shows that management decision making is not influenced by compensations and synergies between accounting treatments and compensation scheme. <br /><strong>Conclusion:</strong> Purchasing method preference which leads to expenditure capitalization among other methods means that either manager’s compensation has not been affected by bottom line, in other words social space might not let manger to use part of incentive compensation, or manager prefers future benefits to the current benefit. <br /> <strong>Objective:</strong> Choosing between accounting treatments for intangible assets, which include expensing or capitalizing all expenditures, is influenced by factors such as the relationship between decision making and compensation scheme. This paper examines influential factors for decision making of management regarding intangible asset investments emphasizing compensation hypothesis. <br /><strong>Methods:</strong> Laboratory experiment is applied to specify the relationship between compensation and management decision making regarding intangible assets. Our population consists of senior managers, board of directors (public and private company) and skilled academics and our examinees equal to 195 people. <br /><strong>Results:</strong> Our findings show that management decision making is influenced by accounting treatments and managers prefer purchasing method to developing method and developing with extra disclosures method which can be explained by certainty effect theory. Moreover, our study shows that management decision making is not influenced by compensations and synergies between accounting treatments and compensation scheme. <br /><strong>Conclusion:</strong> Purchasing method preference which leads to expenditure capitalization among other methods means that either manager’s compensation has not been affected by bottom line, in other words social space might not let manger to use part of incentive compensation, or manager prefers future benefits to the current benefit. <br /> University of TehranAccounting and Auditing Review2645-802025420181222Strategic Game Manager - Auditor: Evidence of Game TheoryStrategic Game Manager - Auditor: Evidence of Game Theory4975187021410.22059/acctgrev.2019.263164.1007954FAMohammad JavadSaeiAssistant Prof., Department of Accounting, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Mashhad, IranMahmoodLariAssistant Prof., Department of Accounting, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Mashhad, Iran0000-0002-8233-026XHamidKhademPh.D Candidate, Department of Accounting, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Mashhad, IranJournal Article20180801<strong>Objective:</strong> The game theory attempts to model math behavior in a strategic situation. This situation occurs when the success of one side of the game depends on the strategies that the other party chooses. The purpose of this study is to find an optimal strategy for the interests of the parties in the game using the game theory approach. <br /><strong>Methods:</strong> The present study uses managers and auditors to maximize their profits, respectively, from profit management strategies and increasing the quality of the audit (reducing the risk of uncritical discovery). The statistical population of the study is a statistical society that is accessible to all companies admitted to the stock market by imposing restrictions on the years 1391 to 1395. Hypotheses for the combined data of 116 companies (575 companies of the year) were tested using the best responder response and the Mann-Whitney test. <br /><strong>Results:</strong> Research findings reveal the existence of “Nash equilibrium” in the strategy of high audit quality strategy and high earning management, therefore in this strategy, neither the auditor nor the manager has the incentive to change the strategy because they will reduce their interests by changing their strategy, Because they will reduce their interests by changing their strategy. <br /><strong>Conclusion:</strong> The results of the research indicate that it is important to consider the audit as a type of strategic environment. The findings of this research can help auditors in analyzing conflicts with the client and selecting the optimal strategy in the audit process.<strong>Objective:</strong> The game theory attempts to model math behavior in a strategic situation. This situation occurs when the success of one side of the game depends on the strategies that the other party chooses. The purpose of this study is to find an optimal strategy for the interests of the parties in the game using the game theory approach. <br /><strong>Methods:</strong> The present study uses managers and auditors to maximize their profits, respectively, from profit management strategies and increasing the quality of the audit (reducing the risk of uncritical discovery). The statistical population of the study is a statistical society that is accessible to all companies admitted to the stock market by imposing restrictions on the years 1391 to 1395. Hypotheses for the combined data of 116 companies (575 companies of the year) were tested using the best responder response and the Mann-Whitney test. <br /><strong>Results:</strong> Research findings reveal the existence of “Nash equilibrium” in the strategy of high audit quality strategy and high earning management, therefore in this strategy, neither the auditor nor the manager has the incentive to change the strategy because they will reduce their interests by changing their strategy, Because they will reduce their interests by changing their strategy. <br /><strong>Conclusion:</strong> The results of the research indicate that it is important to consider the audit as a type of strategic environment. The findings of this research can help auditors in analyzing conflicts with the client and selecting the optimal strategy in the audit process.University of TehranAccounting and Auditing Review2645-802025420181222Investigating the Effect of Withholding Strategy of Bad News on Shareholders’ SatisfactionInvestigating the Effect of Withholding Strategy of Bad News on Shareholders’ Satisfaction5195367021510.22059/acctgrev.2019.260229.1007918FASeyed RezaSeyed Nezhad FahimPh.D. Candidate, Department of Accounting, Faculty of Accounting and Management, Rasht Branch, Islamic Azad University, Rasht, Iran0000-0003-3166-323XMehdiMeshkiAssociate Prof., Department of Accounting, Payame Noor University, Rasht, Iran.0000000327775159EbrahimChiraniAssistant Prof., Department of Business Management, Rasht branch, Islamic Azad University, Rasht, IranGholamrezaMahfooziAssistant Prof., Department of Management, Faculty of Literature and Human Sciences, University of Guilan, Rasht, IranJournal Article20180614<strong>Objective:</strong> According to the prospectus of Iran's Capital Market, this market can be turned into an Islamic finance center in the Middle East. This requires to protect investors’ right through organizing, maintaining and developing a transparent, fair and efficient market for a variety of different types of securities. Transparency and reduction of asymmetry reduce risk in the capital market and increase investor attraction to this market. For this purpose, present research investigates the information asymmetry generated by companies bad news withholding and its role in shareholders’ satisfaction. <br /><strong>Methods:</strong> In this research, abnormal stock return rate before and after the general meeting date has been used to examine the Information Asymmetry. Trading value and open trading days have also been used as indicators to measure the shareholders’ satisfaction. To achieve the research goal, 123 companies listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange during the period from 2011 to 2016 were selected and a panel data approach was used to test the research of hypotheses. <br /><strong>Results:</strong> Findings do not show a significant relationship between withholding strategy of bad news and the trading value, but there is a significant negative relationship between the withholding strategy of bad news and the open trading days. <br /><strong>Conclusion:</strong> Therefore, it is predicted that due to the use of this strategy by the companies, stockholders satisfaction level decreased and in the long run, it causes serious damage to the interests of all involved groups.<strong>Objective:</strong> According to the prospectus of Iran's Capital Market, this market can be turned into an Islamic finance center in the Middle East. This requires to protect investors’ right through organizing, maintaining and developing a transparent, fair and efficient market for a variety of different types of securities. Transparency and reduction of asymmetry reduce risk in the capital market and increase investor attraction to this market. For this purpose, present research investigates the information asymmetry generated by companies bad news withholding and its role in shareholders’ satisfaction. <br /><strong>Methods:</strong> In this research, abnormal stock return rate before and after the general meeting date has been used to examine the Information Asymmetry. Trading value and open trading days have also been used as indicators to measure the shareholders’ satisfaction. To achieve the research goal, 123 companies listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange during the period from 2011 to 2016 were selected and a panel data approach was used to test the research of hypotheses. <br /><strong>Results:</strong> Findings do not show a significant relationship between withholding strategy of bad news and the trading value, but there is a significant negative relationship between the withholding strategy of bad news and the open trading days. <br /><strong>Conclusion:</strong> Therefore, it is predicted that due to the use of this strategy by the companies, stockholders satisfaction level decreased and in the long run, it causes serious damage to the interests of all involved groups.University of TehranAccounting and Auditing Review2645-802025420181222The Investigation of Information Asymmetry’s Moderating Effect on the Relationship between Dividend Payments and Future Stock Price Crash Risk of Firms Listed on the Tehran Stock ExchangeThe Investigation of Information Asymmetry’s Moderating Effect on the Relationship between Dividend Payments and Future Stock Price Crash Risk of Firms Listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange5375547021710.22059/acctgrev.2019.218353.1007463FAGhodratollahTalebniaAssociate Prof., Department of Accounting, Science and Research Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, IranMaryamMetanatMSc., Department of Accounting, Marvdasht Branch, Islamic Azad University, Marvdasht , IranJournal Article20161022<strong>Objective:</strong> The purpose of this paper is to investigate the information asymmetry’s moderating effect on the Relationship between Dividend Payments and Future Stock Price Crash Risk of Firms Listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE). By evaluating the relationships, we tried to find out that whether the cash dividing payment will culminate in decreasing the crash risk of stock price or not. It is expected that in the absence of information asymmetry, the relation between divided payment and crash risk of stock price will change. <br /><strong>Methods:</strong> In this regard, 155 companies were selected for the period of 2010 to 2014. The data from “Rahavard Novin” software, besides that, the financial statements data of the firms are based on TSE official website, the multivariate linear regression model and least squares method and panel data approach has been used to test research hypotheses. <br /><strong>Results:</strong> The results of evaluations demonstrate a significant correlation between the cash dividend payment and the crash risk of future stock price of firms. However, asymmetry of information can not affect this correlation. <br /><strong>Conclusion:</strong> Dividend payouts results in both decreasing free cash flow and external financing providing<strong><em>.</em></strong> Absorbing external cash flow results in monitoring of external suppliers on the performance of managers and firms and decline the crash risk of stock price. While there are significant correlations between asymmetry of information and each of the variables, the hypothesis of asymmetry of information as a Moderating variable (criterion) of this relation, was not confirmed.<strong>Objective:</strong> The purpose of this paper is to investigate the information asymmetry’s moderating effect on the Relationship between Dividend Payments and Future Stock Price Crash Risk of Firms Listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE). By evaluating the relationships, we tried to find out that whether the cash dividing payment will culminate in decreasing the crash risk of stock price or not. It is expected that in the absence of information asymmetry, the relation between divided payment and crash risk of stock price will change. <br /><strong>Methods:</strong> In this regard, 155 companies were selected for the period of 2010 to 2014. The data from “Rahavard Novin” software, besides that, the financial statements data of the firms are based on TSE official website, the multivariate linear regression model and least squares method and panel data approach has been used to test research hypotheses. <br /><strong>Results:</strong> The results of evaluations demonstrate a significant correlation between the cash dividend payment and the crash risk of future stock price of firms. However, asymmetry of information can not affect this correlation. <br /><strong>Conclusion:</strong> Dividend payouts results in both decreasing free cash flow and external financing providing<strong><em>.</em></strong> Absorbing external cash flow results in monitoring of external suppliers on the performance of managers and firms and decline the crash risk of stock price. While there are significant correlations between asymmetry of information and each of the variables, the hypothesis of asymmetry of information as a Moderating variable (criterion) of this relation, was not confirmed.University of TehranAccounting and Auditing Review2645-802025420181222The Effect of Individual and Organizational Characteristics on Acceptance of Underreporting Time by AuditorThe Effect of Individual and Organizational Characteristics on Acceptance of Underreporting Time by Auditor5555707021810.22059/acctgrev.2019.247546.1007767FAGholamhosseinMahdaviProf., Department of Accounting, Faculty of Economics, Management and Social Sciences, Shiraz University, Shiraz, IranRezaZamaniMsc., Department of Accounting, Faculty of Economics, Management and Social Sciences, Shiraz University, Shiraz, Iran.0000000261999802Journal Article20171208<strong>Objective:</strong> The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of individual and organizational characteristics on the acceptance of underreporting time by the auditor which can be used to negotiate the fees of auditors with customers, Distorting budget time, Assessing the effectiveness of auditing and finally audit quality has a negative impact. <br /><strong>Methods:</strong> This research is an applied research in terms of purpose and is a descriptive survey research .The required data of this study were collected and analyzed by a questionnaire completed by 269 employees of the audit firms of the members of Iranian Association of Certified Public Accountants. <br /><strong>Results:</strong> The results of the research show that there is a negative and significant relationship between leadership style of considerations, structure leadership style, internal locus of control and auditor experience with acceptance of underreporting time and there is a positive and significant relationship between the external locus of control and non-members Auditors Iranian Association of Certified Public Accountants with acceptance of underreporting time. Also, there was no relationship between education degree with acceptance of underreporting time. <br /><strong>Conclusion:</strong> Based on the results of the research, it is suggested to audit firms to conduct a leadership style of considerations and structure at the Institute, and to work on auditors who do not have control over the events and attribute success to external factors, such as odds, as well as to lesser experience and have more supervision.<strong>Objective:</strong> The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of individual and organizational characteristics on the acceptance of underreporting time by the auditor which can be used to negotiate the fees of auditors with customers, Distorting budget time, Assessing the effectiveness of auditing and finally audit quality has a negative impact. <br /><strong>Methods:</strong> This research is an applied research in terms of purpose and is a descriptive survey research .The required data of this study were collected and analyzed by a questionnaire completed by 269 employees of the audit firms of the members of Iranian Association of Certified Public Accountants. <br /><strong>Results:</strong> The results of the research show that there is a negative and significant relationship between leadership style of considerations, structure leadership style, internal locus of control and auditor experience with acceptance of underreporting time and there is a positive and significant relationship between the external locus of control and non-members Auditors Iranian Association of Certified Public Accountants with acceptance of underreporting time. Also, there was no relationship between education degree with acceptance of underreporting time. <br /><strong>Conclusion:</strong> Based on the results of the research, it is suggested to audit firms to conduct a leadership style of considerations and structure at the Institute, and to work on auditors who do not have control over the events and attribute success to external factors, such as odds, as well as to lesser experience and have more supervision.University of TehranAccounting and Auditing Review2645-802025420181222Introduction of a New Model in Brand Accounting: Evidences from the Tehran Security MarketIntroduction of a New Model in Brand Accounting: Evidences from the Tehran Security Market5715947021910.22059/acctgrev.2019.227036.1007549FAZahraHonarmandiPhD., Department of Accounting, Faculty of Management and Economy, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, IranSaharSepasiAssociate Prof., Department of Accounting, Faculty of Management and Economy, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, IranAdelAzarProf., Department of Management, Faculty of Management and Economy, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, IranHosseinEtemadiAssociate Prof., Department of Accounting, Faculty of Management and Economy, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran0000-0003-3983-4099Journal Article20170206<strong>Objective:</strong> Presentation of a reliable model for brand measurement and attempt to find a way to enter it into the balance sheet as an asset. <br /><strong>Methods:</strong> The powerful technique of structural equation model (SEM) by smart PLS software and bootstrap method using time series data for 190 active company in the Tehran security market from 2007-2017. <br /><strong>Results:</strong> A new model for brand accounting that all of its variables are financial and has market value, production value and cost of brand expenditures dimensions and it is easily computable for companies and users. <br /><strong>Conclusion:</strong> Using this new idea for modeling and estimating the company’s brand equity can play effective role in brand entrancing to balance sheet, deduction of information asymmetry between managers and stockholders and at last improvement of capital market efficiency.<strong>Objective:</strong> Presentation of a reliable model for brand measurement and attempt to find a way to enter it into the balance sheet as an asset. <br /><strong>Methods:</strong> The powerful technique of structural equation model (SEM) by smart PLS software and bootstrap method using time series data for 190 active company in the Tehran security market from 2007-2017. <br /><strong>Results:</strong> A new model for brand accounting that all of its variables are financial and has market value, production value and cost of brand expenditures dimensions and it is easily computable for companies and users. <br /><strong>Conclusion:</strong> Using this new idea for modeling and estimating the company’s brand equity can play effective role in brand entrancing to balance sheet, deduction of information asymmetry between managers and stockholders and at last improvement of capital market efficiency.