Univrsity Of Tehran Press Accounting and Auditing Review 2645-8020 23 2 2016 08 22 The Impact of Some Corporate Governance Mechanisms on the Auditor’s Report Content The Impact of Some Corporate Governance Mechanisms on the Auditor’s Report Content 155 172 58466 10.22059/acctgrev.2016.58466 FA Rasool Baradaran Hassanzadeh Ghader Hossein Babaei 0000-0003-2694-7326 Ali Faryadi Journal Article 2014 11 10 The financial information audit is a tool for reducing the investment risk and for improving the internal and external organizational decision making quality. The aim of this study is the impact of some corporate governance mechanisms on the auditor’s report content between Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) listed companies. The population of the study is 81 firms (486 observations) during the years of 2006 to 2012. The results show that the probability of receiving unqualified reports in companies with larger audit firms and institutional owners is more. Also, by separating the functions of Chairman and CEO (Duality), the probability of receiving unqualified reports is reduced. Institutional owners and large audit firms reduce the number of paragraphs before the opinion paragraph. Also, the results show that CEO dual responsibility and large audit firms reduce the number of paragraphs after the opinion paragraph. On the other hand, institutional owners and large audit firms reduces the disagreement clauses numbers and the independence of the board of directors increases the number of disagreement clauses. The financial information audit is a tool for reducing the investment risk and for improving the internal and external organizational decision making quality. The aim of this study is the impact of some corporate governance mechanisms on the auditor’s report content between Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) listed companies. The population of the study is 81 firms (486 observations) during the years of 2006 to 2012. The results show that the probability of receiving unqualified reports in companies with larger audit firms and institutional owners is more. Also, by separating the functions of Chairman and CEO (Duality), the probability of receiving unqualified reports is reduced. Institutional owners and large audit firms reduce the number of paragraphs before the opinion paragraph. Also, the results show that CEO dual responsibility and large audit firms reduce the number of paragraphs after the opinion paragraph. On the other hand, institutional owners and large audit firms reduces the disagreement clauses numbers and the independence of the board of directors increases the number of disagreement clauses. https://acctgrev.ut.ac.ir/article_58466_9f230e8af9a04a7d97c27a3fb4d6ad46.pdf